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ABSTRACT
A recent statement by AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre sparked
considerable fear in the public that the Internet may
not be open any more: the ISPs dictate which
sites/applications ﬂourish and which ﬂounder. The state-
ment triggered the heated debate on net neutrality and
ignitedthe battle to enactnet neutralitylegislation. How-
ever, by the date of writing, all attempts to pass net neu-
trality laws have failed.
This paper states our proposition on net neutrality:
ISPs should not be able to discriminate against packets
basedoncontents,applicationtypes, orpacketsourcesor
destinationsthatarenottheirowncustomers;buttheyare
eligibletoofferdifferentiatedservicestotheircustomers.
We present a technical design that aims to achieve this
deﬁnition of net neutrality. Our design prevents an ISP
fromdeterministicallyharminganapplication,a compet-
ing service, or singling out an individual innovator for
extortion.
1 INTRODUCTION
InNovember2005,AT&TCEO(formerlySBCCEO)Ed
Whitacre was quoted in BusinessWeek as follows [3]:
”Now what they [Internetupstarts like Google,
MSN, Vonage, and others] would like to do is
use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them
do that because we have spent this capital and
we have to have a return on it,” says Whitacre.
”So there’s going to have to be some mecha-
nism for these people who use these pipes to
pay for the portion they’re using. Why should
they be allowed to use my pipes?”
This statement triggered strong reactions from con-
sumers and Internet companies. A number of net neu-
trality draft bills [20] were introduced to Congress since
March 2006, in attempt to enact net neutrality. Unfortu-
nately, none has succeeded so far. Grassroot coalitions
such as “Save The Internet” [18] and “It’s Our Net” [13]
were created. Hundreds of organizations and compa-
nies joined the coalitions, and more than a million sig-
natures were collected to support net neutrality. Com-
petitors such as Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, grassroot
groups from both the left and right (e.g. Moveon.organd
Christian Coalition of America), stand on the same side
to support net neutrality.
Proponentsof net neutrality arguethat the openness of
theInternet,i.e.,theabilitytoaccess anycontent,runany
application, or attach any device to the Internet, leads to
the very success of the Internet. This openness and free-
dom drives innovation, promotes free speech, and en-
courages democratic participation [4,18]. If ISPs were
able to discriminate packets based on content or owner-
ship,innovativeideaswouldnotnecessarilyberewarded.
Instead, well-funded ideas or ISPs’ own services would
be more likely to succeed.
Opponents of net neutrality (e.g. telcos) [11] argue
that tiered service, or data prioritization, is a legitimate
business model. The increasingly popular video and au-
dio applications on the Internet put a high bandwidth
demand on their networks. Tiered service can provide
desired quality of service to different applications and
recoup the capital investment used to upgrade their net-
works. Some opponents dislike the idea of regulation
in principle, arguing that market forces are sufﬁcient to
regulate what broadband ISPs would do. If one ISP
blocks contents or applications that consumers desire,
consumers would switch to a different ISP.
Both sides have their points, which makes the debate
overnet neutralitya murkymatter. On the one hand, data
prioritization can improve quality of service and is a le-
gitimate business model. A strict neutralitylaw that does
not allow fee-based data prioritization, e.g. the Markey
Amendment“NetworkNeutralityAct of 2006”[16],will
prohibit ISPs from selling differentiated services, and
prevent customers from purchasing improved quality of
service based on their willingness to pay. On the other
hand, ISPs may abuse data prioritization to discriminate
packets to their favor. For instance, telcos may give a
high priority service to their own VoIP service and inten-
tionally slow down a competitor’s service.
It is difﬁcult to conclude whether any net neutrality
law should or will be passed in the near future, partly be-
cause of the difﬁculty of line-drawing and the suspicion
that there is sufﬁcientmarket competition. A few pundits
have advocated the wait-and-see approach to avoid po-
tentially harmful or toothless regulations [10]. However,
1the status quo without regulation has its own risk: the
openness of the Internet may gradually erode and inno-
vations may be stiﬂed. It’s true that there is some level of
competition (i.e. with cable competing with DSL) in the
broadbandmarket, but practicallyspeaking,users tendto
stay with their existing service providers despite of mild
servicedissatisfactionfora numberofreasons,e.g.,costs
of switching, bundling deals, or cancellation hassles [8].
A broadband ISP may take advantage of this inertia to
gradually migrate to a closed Internet. As an example, a
broadband ISP may intentionally degrade the VoIP ser-
vice offered by Vonage, but give a high priority service
to its own VoIP offerings. A user that experiences a low-
quality VoIP service from Vonage but could use a substi-
tute service offered by his provider might not bother to
switch. Using this tactic, gradually, a broadband service
provider may drive Vonage out of business and make its
own VoIP service thrive. Then it can start to degrade an-
other competitor’s service and so on.
Alternatively, individual innovators that can afford
to pay (say Google) might choose to pay every access
provider to avoid appearing slow to users. However,
it’s unclear whether there is sufﬁcient market force to
regulate the price Google needs to pay, because once a
user has chosen his access provider, that access provider
becomes a monopoly to Google. There is no way for
Google to bypass the access provider to reach the user.
In this paper, we propose a deﬁnition of net neutral-
ity as follows: ISPs should not be able to discriminate
against packets based on contents, application types, or
packet sources or destinations that are not their own cus-
tomers. We call this type of discrimination non-neutral
discrimination. But ISPs are eligible to offer differenti-
ated services to their customers. Our hypothesis is that
thepresentmarketstructuremaynothavesufﬁcientcom-
petition to prevent an access ISP from degrading the ser-
vice of a particularapplicationor a site, but might be suf-
ﬁcient to keep them from intentionally ill-treating their
own customers. For instance, if AT&T slows down a
customer’s VoIP trafﬁc from Vonage, the customer may
not care to switch to a different provider. But if AT&T
slows down all trafﬁc the customer sends or receives, or
charges a higher price for the same quality of service
than what the customer can get at a different provider,
the customer may decide to switch. We rely on the exist-
ing market competition to regulate how ISPs treat their
own customers or peers’ trafﬁc. If there turns out to be
sufﬁcient market competition, then ISPs would not over-
charge their customers for the desired quality of service,
andwouldstrivetomeettheservicerequirementsoftheir
customers. In this situation, a customer’s trafﬁc will not
be intentionally harmed regardless of how ISPs priori-
tize their own services or other customers’ high-quality
services. If there is no sufﬁcient competition, then con-
sumers as a whole would suffer. Hopefully they as a
wholeare a strongervoicethan individualinnovatorsand
this situation can make it clear what net neutrality regu-
lation is needed.
This paper presents a technical design that aims to re-
alize our deﬁnition of net neutrality, a solution that pre-
vents non-neutral discrimination yet allows tiered ser-
vices. A key design challenge is to prevent an ISP from
discriminatingagainsta sourceoradestinationthatis not
its customer (or peer). Standard end-to-end encryption
techniques (e.g., IPsec) can be used to prevent content-
based or application-baseddiscrimination,but the source
or destination address of a packet may still reveal the
identity of a non-customer. To address this challenge,we
design an efﬁcient and stateless neutralizer service that
allows an ISP to “blur” packets to or from its customers.
Thus, other ISPs cannot target an individual customer of
the ISP and double charge the customer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We de-
scribe our design assumptions and design details in § 2
and 3. § 4 provides a preliminary performance analysis.
§ 5 discusses related work, and we conclude in § 6.
2 ASSUMPTIONS
We assume that there are ISPs that support net neutrality,
perhaps due to the competitive pressure in the backbone
market or sharing the belief that an open Internet is the
key to foster innovation. This assumption is not unre-
alistic. For instance, Cogent has made a public state-
ment in support of net neutrality [6]. We assume such
ISPs are willing to offer services to their customers to
protect them from being double-charged by broadband
access ISPs. We also assume that host software can be
modiﬁed to support our design.
We refer to an ISP that intends to discriminate pack-
ets in a non-neutral manner as a discriminatory ISP. We
assume that a discriminatory ISP, despite its eagerness
to make money, will not launch active attacks at its cus-
tomers or peers. Those attacks include modifying packet
contents, man-in-the-middle attacks, and denial of ser-
vice (DoS) attacks. The ISP may eavesdrop on all traf-
ﬁc, perform trafﬁc analysis, delay or drop packets within
its network, but it cannot eavesdrop on trafﬁc outside its
network. We believe this assumption is realistic because
malicious behavior, once detected, may severely damage
an ISP’s reputation.
For simplicity, our current design does not consider
trafﬁc analysis attacks that infer application types or
packet ownships using packet size and timing informa-
tion. If in the practical deployment ISPs can use trafﬁc
analysis to successfully discriminate, we will consider
incorporatingmechanisms such as adaptive trafﬁc mask-
ing [19] to defeat such attacks.
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Figure 1: Theneutralizerboxes mixpacketssent toand from
Cogent’s customers. Other ISPssuch as AT&T and Verizon
cannot differentiate its customers’ packets.
We assume each packet carries a standard IP header,
and additional ﬁelds needed by our design are carried in
a shim layer between IP and an upper layer. The pro-
tocol ﬁeld in an IP header is set to a ﬁxed and known
value. The source and destination address ﬁelds refer to
the ﬁelds in a standard IP header.
3 DESIGN
Thegoalofourdesignis topreventanISPfromdiscrimi-
natingpacketsina non-neutralmanner. We usetwo tech-
niques to accomplish this goal. One is the existing end-
to-end encryption techniques. The other is a neutralizer
service as described below.
Figure 1 shows a high-level view of our design. A
non-discriminatory ISP, Cogent in this example, places
neutralizersattheboundaryofits domain. Theseneutral-
izerscaneitherbeinlineboxesorpartofaborderrouter’s
functionality. A neutralizer helps an ISP’s customers to
hide their addresses from other ISPs. In Figure 1, all
packets sent to (or from) the customers of Cogent, e.g.
Google, Yahoo!, MySpace, or YouTube , will have the
neutralizer’s IP address as their destination (or source)
addresses. We use an anycast address to represent the
neutralizerservice of an ISP. All customers of an ISP use
thesameneutralizeraddress,regardlessofwheretheyare
located. Further, end-to-end encryption is used to pro-
tect packet payload. With this design, a discriminatory
ISP, e.g. AT&T in this example, can only discriminate
against Cogent’s packets as a whole, and cannot deter-
ministically harm an individual customer of Cogent.
3.1 Bootstrapping
To bootstrap a connection, a source inside a discrim-
inatory ISP needs to obtain a destination’s IP address,
the destination’s neutralizers’ addresses, and the destina-
tion’s public key for end-to-end encryption. This boot-
strapping information can be stored at a destination’s
DNS records, and a source may obtain this information
via DNS queries.
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Figure 2: The shaded areas represent encrypted data, and
non-shaded areas represent plain text. The letter E denotes
the encryption function, and the subscript denotes the en-
cryption key. KM isthemaster key of a neutralizer. Theﬁrst
two ﬁelds in a packet diagram are the source and destina-
tion address ﬁelds. The rest of the ﬁelds are either in a shim
header or payload. As can be seen, the address of Cogent’s
customer, Google’s IP, and packet contents are not visible
inside AT&T.
A discriminatoryISP may eavesdrop on its customer’s
DNS queries and discriminate DNS queries based on
the query destination. For instance, AT&T may de-
lay queries for www.google.com if Google does not
pay AT&T to use its pipes. To address this problem, a
source needs to encrypt its DNS queries and send the
queries to DNS resolvers that are not controlled by the
discriminatory ISP. We assume a third party, such as
a non-discriminatory ISP, a large overlay network, e.g.
the PlanetLab [17], or Google itself, can provide DNS
resolvers to clients inside discriminatory ISPs. Those
clients will be conﬁgured with the IP addresses, the pub-
lic keys, and the neutralizers’ addresses (if there is any)
of those DNS resolvers.
End-to-end encryption can use standard techniques
such as IPsec. In this paper, we use end-to-end encryp-
tion as a black box, and do not discuss the details.
3.2 Efﬁcient and Stateless Neutralizer
After a source obtains the bootstrapping information, it
can send packets to a destination via the neutralizer. The
source and the neutralizer must keep the destination ad-
dress as a secret to avoid discrimination. This is sim-
3ilar to anonymous routing [7]. However, a neutralizer
in our context must be highly efﬁcient and scalable, be-
cause it may receive all trafﬁc sent to or from a large
ISP at a peering point. Therefore we cannot use existing
anonymous routing techniques [7,14], that require per-
ﬂow state and expensive public key operations.
Our design uses a combination of light-weight pub-
lic key encryption and symmetric key encryption to im-
prove efﬁciency, and a technique that allows a neutral-
izer to compute a symmetric key from a packet header
to avoid state. We cannot completely avoid public key
encryption (or any technique that’s equivalent) because
protecting the secrecy of the destination address requires
theestablishmentofa sharedsecret betweena sourceand
aneutralizer. Itisa well-knownresultintheoreticalcryp-
tography that the establishment of a shared secret in the
presence of an eavesdropperis impossible using only the
techniques of symmetric-key cryptography[12].
Figure 2 illustrates how a source communicates with
a destination via a neutralizer. The source ﬁrst generates
a short (e.g. 512-bit) one-time RSA public key S, and
sends the key to the neutralizer. The neutralizer keeps a
long term master key KM. When it receives a public key
from a source, it chooses a random nonce, and computes
a keyed hash (Ks) from the nonce, its master key, and the
source address: Ks = hash(KM,nonce,srcIP). Ks will be
used as the symmetric key between the source and the
neutralizer. The neutralizer encrypts the nonce and the
symmetric key using the source’s public key, and returns
the encryption to the source. The source decrypts the
packet, and retrieves the nonce and the symmetric key.
It can then encrypt a destination address with the sym-
metric key and send the packet to the neutralizer. The
source sends the nonce in clear text for the neutralizer
to recover the shared key Ks. When the neutralizer re-
ceives the packet, it recomputes the symmetric key as
Ks = hash(KM,nonce,srcIP) and decrypts the destina-
tion address.
This key setup process has the advantage that the
neutralizer is stateless and performs the more efﬁcient
RSA encryption operation, while the source executes the
slower RSA decryption operation. (An RSA encryption
may involve as few as two multiplications, if the expo-
nent in the public key is 3.) It also maintains the stateless
and fault-tolerant feature of IP routing. As long as the
neutralizers of a domain share the master key KM, any
neutralizer can decrypt the destination address and for-
ward the packet.
A short RSA key represents a tradeoff between efﬁ-
ciency and security. A 512-bit RSA key is only as se-
cure as a 56-bit symmetric key. To improve security,
we let a source use a short RSA key only once, and
expire the symmetric Ks key (encrypted with the RSA
key) quickly. As shown in Figure 2, when a source sends
the ﬁrst packet to a destination using the the symmetric
key Ks, it also sends a key request. When the neutral-
izer forwards the packet with a key request, it stamps a
new nonce, and a new key K′
s into the packet. When
a destination receives this packet, it uses strong end-to-
endencryption,e.g. 1024-bitRSA encryption,toencrypt
this new (nonce, key) pair together with its packet pay-
load, and sends them to the source. A source can encrypt
thedestinationaddressin its subsequentpacketswiththis
new key until it obtains a newer one. As long as a dis-
criminatoryISP does not factorthe short RSA keybefore
K′
s is returned to the source (which takes two round trip
times), the discriminatory ISP cannot decrypt the desti-
nationaddress, andcannot discriminatepackets based on
the destination address.
Another advantage of this design is that if a neutral-
izer cannot support RSA encryption at line speed, it can
ofﬂoad the encryption operation to any customer in its
domain that is willing to help. The neutralizer inserts
the nonce and the symmetric key Ks in the source’s key
request packet and forwards the packet to the customer
to encrypt using the public key in the request packet. A
customer (e.g. Google) would have incentive to help be-
cause the source may intend to communicate with it.
We havealsoconsideredamoreobviousdesignchoice
that lets a source encrypt a destination address using a
neutralizer’s public key when it sends the ﬁrst packet to
a destination. This alternative has the advantages of sav-
ing one round trip time for key setup and preventing the
man-in-the-middle attack, as the public key of a neutral-
izer can be certiﬁed. However, it places a higher burden
on a neutralizer: the neutralizer must perform a public
key decryption operation that cannot be ofﬂoaded to any
customer.
We chosethe ﬁrst keysetupapproachbecausea higher
processing overhead makes a neutralizer more vulner-
able to DoS attacks and temporary trafﬁc overloading,
while an extraroundtriptime forkeyset up canbe amor-
tized over multiple packets. A source can use the same
symmetric key to send any packet destined to any cus-
tomer in the neutralizer’s domain until the neutralizer’s
master key expires. We also assume that a discrimina-
tory ISP will not risk its reputation to launch man-in-
the-middle attacks. Thus, the second advantage of the
alternative approach is not essential.
A return packet from a customer in a neutralizer’s do-
main must have its source address anonymized, yet the
recipient must be able to retrieve the necessary key to
decrypt the payload of the packet. In our design, when
a destination returns a packet to the source, the return
packetwill includethedestination’saddressinthesource
IP address ﬁeld, the neutralizer’s address in the desti-
nation IP ﬁeld, the initiator’s address and the nonce in-
cluded in the forward packet in a shim header, as shown
4in Figure 2. When a neutralizer receives a return packet
from a customer (we assume the neutralizer can tell this
from the source address ﬁeld), it encrypts the source ad-
dress (Google’s IP in Figure 2) using the symmetric key
indicated by the nonce, replaces the source address with
its own anycast address, and sets the destination address
to be the initiator’s address. When the initiator receives
this packet, it can use the nonce and the neutralizer’s ad-
dress to locate the key Ks it shares with the neutralizer,
and decrypt the original source address (Google’s IP). It
can then use this address to identify the communication
session, and decrypt the packet payload.
3.3 Reverse-direction Communication
Communication initiated by a customer (e.g. Google in
Figure 2) inside the neutralizer’s domain to an outside
destination can happen in a similar fashion but with less
overhead. In the initial key set up phase, the customer
may simply request a nonce and a symmetric key from
a neutralizer without encryption. After the customer ob-
tains a shared key with a neutralizer, the rest of the pro-
cess is similartowhatwe havedescribedabove. Thecus-
tomer encrypts the shared key with its intended destina-
tion’s public key and sends the encrypted key. When the
destination, e.g. Ann’s computer in Figure 2, receives a
packet, if it cannotlocate a symmetric keycorresponding
to the nonce and the neutralizer’s address, it will attempt
to use its public key to decrypt the packet. If successful,
the destination obtains the shared key and can use it to
encrypt the initiator’s address and send packets via the
neutralizer.
3.4 Quality of Service
In our design, a discriminatory ISP can still offer dif-
ferentiated services [1] to its customers, as a neutralizer
will not modify the Differentiated Services Code Point
(DSCP) in a standard IP header. The discriminatory
ISP may provide differentiated services according to the
DSCPs in packet headers.
However, a discriminatory ISP can no longer keep per
ﬂowstate (aﬂowreferstoasourceandadestinationpair)
to provide guaranteed services [2] to anonymized trafﬁc.
There are at least two remedies to this problem. The ﬁrst
is for a neutralizer to assign a dynamic address to a cus-
tomer that initiates a QoS session, e.g. an RSVP session.
This dynamic address allows the discriminatory ISP to
identify a ﬂow, but does not allow it to map the ﬂow to
a speciﬁc customer. Another possibility is that the cus-
tomer may request not to be anonymized if it has pur-
chased guaranteed service from the discriminating ISP.
The neutralizer service is optional, and a customer does
not have to use it.
3.5 Multi-homed Sites
A site may connect to multiple ISPs that offer the neu-
tralizer service. In this situation, the site may publish
multiple neutralizers’ addresses in its DNS records, each
address corresponding to one ISP. The ISP-level path of
the site’s incomingand outgoingtrafﬁc is thencontrolled
by how other sources pick the neutralizers, and is no
longer controlled by the site’s BGP routers. The path
chosen by other sources may interferewith a site’s trafﬁc
engineering effort. For instance, if one provider is con-
gested, the site may want all trafﬁc comes from a differ-
ent provider,but other sources may choosethe congested
provider. A similar situation occurs in IPv6 [9], in which
a multi-homed site obtains multiple addresses, one from
each provider. The pathof the incomingtrafﬁc to a site is
determinedby which address a source chooses to contact
the site. We can borrow any technique that can balance
trafﬁc load in that context to balance trafﬁc between dif-
ferent neutralizers. In general, two hosts may always use
trial-and-error to ﬁnd a path that’s working for them.
3.6 What Can Still Go Wrong?
Denial of Service Attacks: A neutralizer box may be
subject to DoS attacks. Although our design places the
more efﬁcient RSA encryptionoperation at a neutralizer,
a public key operation is still expensive. If attackers
ﬂood key setup packets at line speed, a neutralizer may
be overloaded. It is outside the scope of this paper to
come up with a complete DoS defense mechanism. But
a neutralizer can invoke DoS defense mechanisms such
as pushback [15] to get rid of attack trafﬁc.
One complication is that if attackers are inside a neu-
tralizer’s domain, the neutralizer’s anonymization func-
tion may hide attack sources. This problem is similar to
source address spooﬁng. Pushback can be used to de-
fend this type of attack, as it is designed to function well
with source address spooﬁngand does not rely on source
addresses to ﬁlter attack trafﬁc.
Packet discrimination: Our design does not com-
pletely “blur” all packets. A discriminatory ISP can still
discriminate packets in at least three ways: 1) discrim-
inate based on its customers’ or neutralizers’ addresses;
2) discriminate against encrypted trafﬁc; 3) discriminate
against key setup packets. (The third discrimination is
possible because an ISP may infer a key setup packet
from the nonce ﬁeld, or from the packet length, or from
inter-packet timing.) We are not concerned with these
types of discriminations because none of them allows an
ISP to deterministically harm an application, a competi-
tor’s service, or a non-customer/peer. If an ISP can only
deterministically discriminate against its own customers
(or its direct peers), then we rely on market forces to dis-
cipline what they would do (§ 1).
5Good-intentioned discrimination: If packets are not
encryptedor neutralized,an ISP may inspect packet con-
tents and prevent unwanted trafﬁc (e.g. viruses) from
reaching an end user. Unfortunately, our design prevents
such good-intentioned discrimination. Nonetheless, we
believe it is a worthy tradeoff, because we cannot afford
to lose the openness of the Internet.
4 PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
This sectionpresents a preliminaryevaluationonthe per-
formance of the neutralizer. We implemented the packet
processing logic of a neutralizer using a modiﬁed Click
Router [5] on Linux 2.6.16.13. The neutralizer in our
testbed has an AMD Opteron2.6GHzdual coreCPU and
an Intel pro/1000 GT quad-port server adapter.
A neutralizer does an RSA encryption when process-
ing a key setup packet. In our experiments, the neutral-
izer can output response packets at 24.4kpps. If we as-
sumeaneutralizer’smasterkeylasts foranhour,asource
outside a neutralizer’s domain at most needs to send a
key request once an hour. Thus, a commodity PC can
simultaneously serve 88 million sources for key setup.
A neutralizer does a hash computation and a symmet-
ric key encryption or decryption when it receives a nor-
mal data packet. Our implementation uses 128-bit AES
for both hashing and encryption/decryption. In our ex-
periments,a client machinesends neutralizedUDP pack-
ets with 64 bytes payload to the neutralizer. The total
packet size is 112 bytes after adding headers, nonce, en-
crypted destination IP address, and alignment padding.
The neutralizer is able to output packets with decrypted
destination IP addresses at 422kpps. This throughput
is limited by the neutralizer’s hardware architecture, as
the neutralizer can only forward vanilla IP packets of the
same size at 600kpps. Our openssl speed tests show that
the CPU of the neutralizercan performthe cryptographic
operations at 2.35 million per second. We expect that
special hardware that is optimized for packet forwarding
can achieve a much higher packet throughput.
5 RELATED WORK
The most related work is anonymous routing [7,14].
Anonymous routing aims to anonymize both the source
and destination addresses of a packet, while our design
only aims to anonymize the non-customer address from
a discriminatory ISP. As a result, our design is consid-
erably more efﬁcient and scalable in terms of resource
consumption. In our design, routers don’t keep per-
ﬂow state, and perform much fewer public key encryp-
tion/decryption operations.
6 CONCLUSION
The debate over net neutrality has caught much pub-
lic attention recently. Despite much effort, no essen-
tial net neutrality legislation is passed. This paper
presents a technical approach to net neutrality. We de-
scribe a design that prevents ISPs from discriminating
packets based on contents, application types, or non-
customer/peer addresses. Our design prevents an ISP
from deterministically discriminating against a competi-
tor’s service, a novel application, or singling out an in-
dividual innovator for extortion. At the core of our de-
sign is a neutralizer service that anonymizes trafﬁc sent
to or from a discriminatory ISP. The neutralizer is state-
less and uses highly efﬁcient cryptographic operations.
We believe it can scale to support the trafﬁc load of a
large ISP. It’s our future work to implement the neutral-
izer service and evaluate its performance.
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